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transfigured  on  account  of  the  theoretical  and  ethical  concerns  revealed  by  statelessness. 
Taking my point of departure from the work of Hannah Arendt, I show how the phenomenon of 
statelessness  reveals  tensions  in  our  conceptions  of  political membership  and  human  rights, 
while  highlighting  the  dilemmas  that  any  approach  to  democratic  inclusion must  address.  As 
Arendt’s work emphasizes, one of the greatest challenges to the cosmopolitan ideal of realizing 
universal human rights is the way in which realizing rights claims is tied to political membership 
within  a  particular  community.  The  crucial  loss  of  a  ‘right  to  have  rights’  suffered  by  the 
stateless is not one of a ‘natural’ right but rather the loss of a right of belonging to a community 
within which such rights have meaning in the locus of citizenship. The paper then shifts from a 
diagnostic  to  a  prescriptive  focus,  turning  to  Jurgen  Habermas’  notion  of  discourse  ethics 
grounded  in his account of communicative action as a means to theorize the  issues raised by 
statelessness  and  the  idea  of  a  claim  to  community.  While  discourse  ethics  offers  a  useful 
framework,  I  argue  that  we  need  a  supplementary  orientation  toward  openness,  given  that 
statelessness  has  at  its  core  the  problem  of  inclusion.  In  addressing  this  more  fundamental 
question of inclusion, I turn to contemporary theorists of agonistic democracy whose focus on 
the  contestability  of  terms  and  the  fundamentally  unsettled  nature  of  the  political  provide 
















Writing  in  the mid‐twentieth century with  the horrors of  the Second World War  still  close at 
hand, Hannah Arendt noted that the emergence of stateless persons as the “most symptomatic 
group  in  contemporary  politics”  served  as  both  a  catalytic  factor  in  the  emergence  of 
totalitarianism  and  as  a  lasting  crisis  of  the  post‐totalitarian  world.  Of  course,  since  Arendt 
penned her farsighted observations, the oft referred to ‘humanitarian problem’ that refugees and 
stateless persons have been  seen  to pose  has  only  become  far more  ubiquitous, with  over  17 
million people classified as  refugees and displaced persons  to date.1 Moreover, alongside  the 
equally  pressing  international  issues  of  immigration  and  humanitarian  intervention,  the 
questions posed by the phenomena of widespread statelessness has only intensified the degree 
to  which  commitments  to  universal  human  rights  and  the  sovereign  claims  of  political 
communities  have been  seen  to  clash,  thereby  complicating  discussions  of  global  justice  and 
the emerging international legal norms of our increasingly interconnected present. Indeed, for 
our modern paradigm of human rights that has been philosophically advanced on universalistic 
grounds, and yet  linked  to  the  incorporation of  such  rights  into national  institutions and  law, 
the  refugee  appears  as  a  figure  both  least  protected  and  most  vulnerable  under  present 
international arrangements.  
Yet  despite  the  apparent  challenges  the position of  the  refugee  appears  to offer  toward our 















to  the position of  the refugee often distorts or clouds discussions of  international obligations 
and  human  rights,  allowing  us  to  gloss  over  the  underlying  inconsistencies  in  our  prevailing 
understandings of international order and global justice. A central example of this “blind spot” 
in contemporary political theory is found in the later work of the seminal political theorist John 
Rawls.  In his The Law of Peoples, an attempt to work out a theory of  justice for  international 
relations,  Rawls  entirely  elides  the  ethical  and  political  issues  raised  by  immigration  and 
statelessness–problematically  articulating  a  vision  of  interstate  relations  that  puts  the 





With  the  above  considerations  in  mind,  this  paper  will  attempt  to  provide  a  provisional 
engagement  with  the  particular  issues  raised  by  the  position  of  the  refugee  and,  more 
generally, to suggest that the questions of statelessness should occupy a far more central place 






brings  to  light  the  precarious  position  of  the  refugee  as  located  out  of  the  bounds  of 
community,  while  also  highlighting  the  particular  dilemmas  that  any  approach  toward 
statelessness will  have  to  address.  The  second  section will  shift  focus  from a  diagnostic  to  a 
prescriptive  dimension,  by  turning  to  the  approach  of  discourse  ethics  offered  in  Jurgen 
Habermas’ work  as  a  potential means  to  theorize  the  issues  raised  by  statelessness  and  the 
question  of  the  claim  or  right  to  community.  As will  become  clear,  the  approach  offered  by 
Habermas’  is  suggestive  of  novel  ways  of  negotiating  and  transforming  our  conceptions  of 
political  membership  toward  a more  just  and  cosmopolitan  conception.  However,  while  the 
paradigm of discourse ethics provides a promising framework, I will suggest that this approach 
is  in  need  of  a  supplementary  orientation  toward  openness,  given  that  the  question  of 
statelessness  has  at  its  very  core  the  problematic  of  inclusion.  In  addressing  this  more 
fundamental dimension of the question of inclusion, I shall turn to the work and insights  of the 
contemporary  theorists of  agonistic democracy William Connolly  and Chantal Mouffe. As will 
become clear, the focus of these theorists on the contestability of terms and the fundamentally 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II. THE PROBLEMATIC OF STATELESSNESS: SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Having established our  trajectory of analysis, our engagement with  the  issue of  statelessness 
will begin by turning to the work of Hannah Arendt. Her thought offers a unique perspective on 
our  contemporary  historical  situation  that  importantly  challenges  our  orientation  toward  the 
relationship of  human  rights  and  citizenship,  providing  a  remarkable  vantage point  from which  to 
consider such problems anew. Arguably, the figure of the refugee is central to Arendt’s concerns 
regarding our  forms of modern politics and community,  in part driving her  critical  analysis  in 
both The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition. However, it is in the former work 
that the situation of the refugee is given most explicit treatment, and it is to Arendt’s analysis of 
the emergence of mass statelessness  that  I  shall now turn to  in order  to briefly explicate  the 
problematic concerns raised by such phenomena. 
As  a  project,  The  Origins  of  Totalitarianism  represents  Arendt’s  attempt  to  understand  the 
historically  unprecedented  emergence  of  totalitarianism  in  the  20th  Century  through  an 
extensive study of the diffuse conditions under which it arose.  In her study, Arendt specifically 
identifies  the  emergence of widespread  statelessness—the  rendering of masses of  people  as 
rightless and uprooted—as one among many conditions that made possible the horrors of total 
domination  in  the  modern  world.  Indeed,  with  the  appearance  of  the  refugee  or  stateless 
person  as  a  pervasive  phenomenon,  many  of  the  previously  submerged  dangers  and 
contradictions of  the nation‐state system came to the  fore—perhaps most  importantly  in  the 
conceptual and practical crisis  inherent  in the notion of  inalienable universal human rights.  In 
her  discussion  subtitled  “The Decline  of  the Nation‐State  and  the  End of  the Rights  of Man” 











called  ‘human  rights,’    paradigmatically  expressed  in  the  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man, 
rapidly  began  to  reveal  their  fragile  and  contingent  basis  amid  such  unprecedented 
developments.  
In her discussion of the problematic nature of ‘human rights’ Arendt draws our attention to the 
basis  on  which  these  rights  were  proclaimed—namely  an  abstract  conception  of  man 
generalized beyond his situation within a political community, a conception that depended on 







rights  was  the  political  sovereign  itself.  A  tension  arose,  in  that  the  very  rights  set  forth  as 





was  the deep  interrelation and dependency between  so‐called  ‘human rights’ and membership 
rights within a polity.  Thus  the  fundamental  loss  suffered  by  the  rightless was  not  a  loss  of  a 
natural, inalienable right. It was rather the loss of their right to belong to a community in which 
such rights could have meaning, and of a place  in the world  in which their words and actions 
would  be  taken  into  account.  This  ‘right  to  have  rights,’  the  fundamental  right  which  the 
refugee  lost,  was  completely  absent  from  the  framework  of  The  Rights  of  Man.  The  very 













laws, which  supposedly would  flow  from  the  Rights  of Man, and  sovereign,  that  is,  bound  by  no 
universal law and acknowledging nothing superior to itself.3 
In  her  tracing  of  a  genealogy  of  the  modern  nation  state,  we  see  that  the  crisis  of  modern 
statelessness,  as  precipitated  by  the  exclusionary  logic  of  what  had  been  thought  to  be  ‘human 
rights,’  lies  in  this  underlying  tension  between  the  state  and  the  nation,  as well  as  that  between 
universal rights and civil rights. Arendt’s analysis suggests that the phenomena of statelessness is not 
merely  coeval  with  the  rise  of  the  nation‐state  system,  but  a  direct  extension  of  the  logic  of 
sovereignty  that  system  is  predicated  upon.  But  what  perhaps  was  most  striking  about  the 
                                                
3 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 230. 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position of the refugee was the way in which de‐nationalization related to the conditions that 
underwrite  the  human  ability  to  act  inhumanely  to  others.  Within  Arendt’s  analysis  the 
situation  of  the  refugee  is  tantamount  to  the  loss  of  the  inter‐subjective  “modes  in  which 
human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men.”4 Thus within 
Arendt’s  analysis  the  phenomena  of  statelessness  is  not  only  symptomatic  of  contemporary 
exclusionary modes  of  community  and  the  concomitant  tensions  between  human  rights  and 
state sovereignty, but actually constitutive of modalities of relatedness that allow human rights 
violations to take place. 
As  I have tried to emphasize above,  the phenomena of statelessness  is  fundamentally  tied to 
the  tension  we  find  between  the  universalizing  impulse  of  human  rights  discourse  and  the 
limitations  imposed  by  our  current  understandings  of  citizenship  and  the  state.  As  the 
sociologist Saskia Sassen has noted of  the developments of  the  inter‐war era,  “the emergent 
interstate  system  was  the  key  to  the  creation  of  the  stateless  person,  the  identification  of 
refugees as such, and  their  regulation or control.”5  Indeed, perhaps what  is most  remarkable 
about  Arendt’s  insights  is  how  pertinent  they  remain  for  our  contemporary  situation.  The 
primary international response to the issues posed by statelessness has been the constitution 
of  intergovernmental organizations responsible  for overseeing the condition of  refugees—but 
these  institutions  are  themselves  symptomatic  of  the  only  intensified  pervasiveness  of 
statelessness within the world. Moreover, despite the presence of emerging norms concerning 
the  question  of  humanitarian  intervention,  in  which  sovereignty  has  become  understood  as 
contingent upon the state’s responsibility to protect,6 norms regarding the position of refugees 
and asylum seekers have become only more ambiguous in relation to the prerogatives of raison 
d'etat. Three remarkable,  though by no means  isolated,  recent  illustrations of  the unresolved 
nature of these tensions clearly indicate the crucial limitations of modern human rights norms 
for dealing with such issues. The first has been the 2001‐2008 Pacific Solution of the Australian 
government,  under  which  a  system  of  offshore  detention  centers  were  established  for 
individuals entering the country without valid papers  in order to provide greater discretion  in 
the  evaluation  of  asylum  seekers  without  violating  the  human  rights  norms  that  come  into 
effect with landed status. Such a system, which lived on in the country’s mandatory detention 
policy,  led  to  the  pervasive  long‐term  incarceration  of  asylum  seekers  and  refugees.7  The 
second notable case is to be found in the intervening stages of the British Belmarsh decision of 
2004 which allowed the UK government to detain indefinitely non‐citizens who would normally 
face  deportation,  but  who  could  not  be  deported  without  derogation  from  human  rights 










obligations  because  of  the  risk  they  face  of  being  tortured  in  their  country  of  origin.8  The 




for  foreigners  have  mushroomed  across  the  European  Union”  with  experiments  with  the 
externalization of borders along the lines of the ‘Pacific Solution’ already beginning to take form 
through multilateral  agreements with  bordering  states.9   While  these  cases  provide  extreme 
examples of the conflict between human rights norms and state sovereignty within the policies 
of  advanced  industrial  democracies,  they  are  merely  emblematic  of  general  contradictory 
features of our international system. Civil wars, natural disasters, widespread poverty and failed 
states,  amid  a  world  of  only  tightening  borders  have  only  increased  the  number  of  people 
caught between the interstices of our international order.  
I would contend, along with Arendt, that the underlying source of our contemporary inability to 
manage  these  pathologies  of  the  nation  state  system  lie  in  the  exclusionary  nature  of  our 
current forms of citizenship and our inability to recognize the fundamental nature of the right 
to belong  to a community. Indeed, what is perhaps most remarkable about our current era of 
globalization  is  that,  with  supposedly  growing  mobility  and  interconnectedness  across  the 
world, the ability of human persons to move across borders would pale in comparison to that of 
international trade and monetary exchange. The costs of this contradictory logic are of course 






Having  provided  a  provisional  sketch  of  the  problematic  conceptual  challenges  raised  by  the 
phenomena of statelessness, I would now like to turn to the theoretical approach toward these 













initially  by  Arendt  is  suggested  by  the  critical  edge  discourse  ethics  potentially  offers  for 





the  theory  of  communicative  action,  with  its  focus  on  intersubjective  engagement  and 
attentiveness  to  the  distorting  effects  of  power  relations,  further  confirm  the  promise  of 
appealing to his work within the context of our present discussion.12 
In  taking  up  Habermas’  approach  of  discourse  ethics  for  the  issue  of  statelessness,  I  will 
interpret  Habermas  as  a  post‐metaphysical,  non‐foundationalist  theorist.13  Based  on  this 
reading, I suggest the promise of his approach lies in providing a conceptualization of the issues 
raised by statelessness and citizenship without having to rely upon problematic philosophical or 
metaphysical  assumptions  that  often  seem  to  underpin  our  understanding  of  human  rights. 




regarding  the  nature  of  language  as  having  as  its  “inherent  telos”  the  reaching  of  mutual 
understanding.14  However  the  apparent  import  of  such  accusations  of  a  hidden 
foundationalism are  themselves  seemingly overstated.15 Moreover,  regardless of whether we 
are  fully  sanctioned  in  interpreting Habermas’  theoretical  commitments  in  this way,  I believe 
we can easily take up his  position while still acknowledging that his account of language may 
merely  have  the  status  of,  to  use  Connolly’s  phrase,  “premises  deeply  rooted  in  modernity 

















itself.”16 Moreover,  the  appropriation of  an  approach  said  to  be  rooted  in  the  emergence of 
modernity itself seems entirely appropriate for interrogating the distinctively modern forms of 
community and collective identity that are implicated in the production of statelessness.17 
In  turning  to  Habermas’  framework,  we  should  begin  by  recognizing  that  the  approach  of 
discourse  ethics  is  best  understood  as  an  extension  of  the  conception  of  communicative 
‘rationality’  presented  in  The  Theory  of  Communicative  Action.  The  conception  of 






unconstrained  argumentative  discourse,  Habermas  begins  with  the  constrained  assumption 
that normative claims can be redeemed in a way analogous to truth claims.20 The weakening of 




out  of  implications  of  his  conception  of  communicative  rationality  in  relation  to  claims  of 
normative  validity  and  moral  legitimacy.  As  Thomas  McCarthy  notes,  for  Habermas  the 
elaboration  of  the  principles  of  ethics  justification  “begins  with  a  reflective  turn,  for  these 
principles  are  built  into  the  very  structure  of  practical  discourse  itself.”22  Therefore  it  is  the 
model  of  argumentative  discourse  that  provides  the  principle  of  discourse  ethics,  that  “only 
those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in 
their  capacity  as  participants  in  a  practical  discourse.”23  The  principle  of  discourse  ethics 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therefore  stipulates  the  intersubjective    condition  under  which  a  norm  can  be  justified  as 
expressing the common will of the plurality of those who will be effected. 







and  the phenomenal  realm, and  the  insistence on a dialogical basis  for moral  consciousness. 
For Habermas the criteria is, contra Kant, not what the individual can will without contradiction, 
but what all affected parties can agree to  in rationally grounded discourse. Key to Habermas’ 
approach  is  the  way  he  construes  the  universalizing  dimension  of  moral  discourse  in  a  de‐
centered  fashion.  Hence  the  criteria  of  impartiality  for  discourse  ethics,  taken  from  the 
suppositions  of  everyday  communication,  is  captured  in  the  principle  of  universalism  for  the 
validity of every norm, such that: “All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects 
its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests.”24 
This  is  because  Habermas  identifies  the  fault  in  Kantian  approaches  to  the  principle  of 
universalization  as  lying  in  the  reliance  on  the  orientation  of  a  subject‐centered  perspective. 
Such approaches fail to fully acknowledge that “valid norms must deserve recognition from all 
concerned” and instead presents a conception of moral norms in which the “process of judging 
is  relative  to  the vantage point and perspective of some and not all  concerned.”25 Moreover, 
Habermas’ approach openly acknowledges the situated nature of the participants to discourse, 
and therefore attempts to avoid the monological and transcendental dimensions of the Kantian 
tradition.  As  Habermas  writes:  “Discourses  take  place  in  particular  social  contexts  and  are 
subject  to  the  limitations  of  time  and  space…their  participants  are  not  Kant’s  intelligible 
characters but real human beings.”26  In alternatively proposing a principle that “constrains all 
affected  to  adopt  the  perspectives  of  all  others  in  the  balance  of  interests”  one  can  read 
Habermas  as  following  up  on  the  Hegelian  critique  of  the  ‘abstract  universal’  of  Kantian 
morality  that  had  initially  suggested  an  attentiveness  to  the  inter‐subjective  dimension  of 
interaction  so central  to  the overall project of  communicative action.27 Within  the domain of 
our  concerns  over  the  question  of  inclusion,  this  aspect  of  Habermas’  theory  importantly 
tethers  the  approach  of  discourse  ethics  and  grounds  the  criteria  of  the  inter‐subjective 
validation of norms in the situated nature of participants. 


















from  the  right  of  a  nation  or  people  to  determine  the  structure  and  form  of  their mode  of 
collective life. In this sense, it is by appeal to the claim of self‐determination that the exclusion 
of  the  asylum  seeker  and  refugee  are  purportedly  legitimated  by  the  traditional  norms  of 
national sovereignty. Moreover, from the standpoint of citizenship, one might infer that part of 
the moral justification of the bounded nature of states would have to be tied up with the claim 
of  all  to  membership.  In  this  sense,  the  claim  to  community,  which  must  clearly  imply  the 
exclusion  of  those  outside  the  boundaries  of  such  a  group,  is  supposedly  redeemed  by  the 
expectation that those without have recourse to their own forms of self‐determining political 
membership.  At  least  as  much  seems  to  be  implied  in  the  somewhat  euphemistic  term  of 
‘displaced  persons’—as  if  the  issues  posed  by  statelessness  were  merely  the  products  of 
disturbances  of  the  interstate  system,  rather  then  symptomatic  of  deeper  problems.30 
However,  in this context  it  is crucial to note that  in understanding the claim to community as 
both a normative and a moral demand, we need to recognize that the universalizing dimension 
of such an appeal must be directed both to those within and those outside particular polities. 
But  as  we  have  seen  in  our  earlier  interrogation  of  the  relation  of  citizenship  to  the  state,  the 
production of refugees seems to be inherent in the logic of our contemporary forms of community. 
How are we  to  reconcile  the  status  of  the modern  state  as  the underlying  source of  the  crisis  of 
statelessness, and as the only means by which a ‘right to have rights’ may be secured? 
Having  laid  out  in  broad  outline  the  current  structure  of  presumptions  that  underwrite  our 
contemporary  understanding  of  citizenship  and  polity,  it  should  be  apparent  that  the 
framework of discourse ethics forces us to re‐evaluate the legitimacy of such norms. From the 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impartial and inclusive perspective suggested by discourse ethics, the normative privileging of 
the position of the citizen cannot simply be presumed, while the sovereign prerogatives of the 
state  to  control  entrance  and  limit  citizenship  are now  in need of  substantial  justification.  In 
asking  us  to  consider  whether  our  current  norms  of  citizenship  and  sovereignty  would  be 
accepted  by  all  those  effected  by  such  norms,  we  must  clearly  take  into  consideration  the 
position of  those who  are most  disadvantaged by  such  institutions  and who  find  themselves 
asymmetrically located in relation to citizens—that is, at the periphery or outside the bounds of 
inclusion.  In  this  appropriation  of  discourse  ethics,  normative  justification  cannot  be merely 
circumscribed to the concerns of those within political communities, but must come to account 
for  those  without.  Moreover,  while  our  reading  of  Arendt  brought  to  the  fore  the  factors 
producing  statelessness  at  its  emergence  as  a  mass  phenomenon,  at  our  current  historical 
juncture the claims to validity of such norms have only become more problematic as the idea 
and  integrity  of  the  nation  state  has  itself  become  conceptually  dubious.  The  question  that 
discourse  ethics  asks  us  to  raise  is whether  the norms of  sovereignty  and  self‐determination 




rights  is actually  secondary  for our  current  considerations.  From the perspective of discourse 
ethics, the real question is whether such stringent and exclusionary criteria can be justified at 
all. 
When  taking  into  consideration  the  perspective  of  those  caught  in  between  communities  or 
who  find  themselves  admitted  under  a  precarious  or  illicit  status—asylum  seekers,  refugees, 
immigrants—we  have  good  reason  to  doubt  the  acceptability  of  contemporary  norms  of 
citizenship and territorial sovereignty. Indeed, if our foregoing analysis is correct in suggesting a 
fundamental  relation between our  current modalities  of  community  and  citizenship with  the 
practices  of  exclusion  that  produce  stateless,  we  have  good  reason  to  believe  that  a  moral 
imperative exists for weakening the boundaries of states and liberalizing the means of gaining 
membership within  communities. While  still  allowing  for  the  values  of  cultural  integrity  and 
communal  life,  a  consideration  of  the  question  of  inclusion  from  the  position  of  all  those 
affected  by  the  exclusionary  norms  of  membership  will  clearly  push  us  to  take  up  a  more 
cosmopolitan perspective. One form this might take is in the recognition of a fundamental right 
to claim citizenship within a polity—with the burden of proof against such a claim lying on the 
part  of  the  state.  The  development  and  articulation  of  such  a  right  to  belong  would  not 
necessarily be incompatible with some forms of communal integrity. However such claims will 
have  to  be  justified  in  relation  to  the  claims  of  those  outside  of  a  particular  state,  and  not 
simply decided in advance by the presumptive bias of the national interest. 
As  I have tried to  indicate  in the foregoing discussion,  the approach of discourse ethics when 
universally  applied  to  the  realm of  those  affected  by  our  contemporary  norms  of  citizenship 
and sovereignty forces us to reconsider the contours of our current practices. However, I would 
also  like to suggest that the formal dimensions of discourse ethics raise certain  issues for our 




his  approach,  the  principle  of  discourse  ethics  is  procedural  rather  then  substantive  in  form, 
making reference to the discursive process of the evaluation of normative claims to validity. As 
he writes: 





aims to supercede, discourse ethics  itself  is not aimed at  the generation of moral norms, but 
rather  offers  a  way  of  evaluating  and  potentially  legitimating  norms  that  are  brought  into 
question. However as we have noted above, unlike the monological dimension of the Kantian 
approach,  Habermas  explicitly  constructs  discourse  ethics  around  a  communicative  model, 
thereby  explicitly  emphasizing  the  dimension  of  inter‐subjective  agreement  between  a 
community of participants.    Yet  the very  virtue of discourse ethics  in attempting  to base  the 
validation of  norms  in  the  actual  participation of  concrete  agents  in  practical  discourse  itself 
raises questions about how the  realm of participants  is  constituted.   As Habermas notes,  the 
very  idea  of  practical  discourse  is  dependent  on  a  “horizon  provided  by  the  lifeworld  of  a 




politically  constituted. An  instructive example of  this  is  the gradual  shift we have seen  in  the 
past  few  decades  in  the  refugee  policies  of many Western  industrial  democracies.  Arguably, 
there  has  been  a  widespread  move  in  policy  away  from  conceptualizing  such  issues  as 
concerning  human  rights,  and  toward  treating  the  claims  of  refugees  and  asylum  seekers 
primarily  as  an  immigration  question.  Such  trends  are  exemplified  more  recently  in  the 
emergence of policies designed to deflect claimants without violating international obligations, 





the  norms  that  would  secure  their  inclusion  in  the  first  place.  The  potentiality  of  discourse 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ethics  to  validate  new  and  intrinsically  open  forms  of  community  is  clear  from  our  earlier 
discussion, but  from our  contemporary  standpoint we seem terribly  far  from having adopted 
the  “enlarged  mentality”  that  the  implementation  of  such  considerations  would  seem  to 
demand. Moreover,  the rootedness of our  fundamental conceptions of democratic  legitimacy 
in the idea of bounded communities makes the leap to the standpoint of ‘citizen of the world,’ 
or  even  to  a  post‐national  consciousness,  seemingly  rather  distant.    This  suggests  that 
addressing  the  issue  of  statelessness  in  the  present  requires  that  we  direct  our  attention 





more  inclusive  understandings  of  community  and  citizenship,  we  will  now  engage  with  the 
emergent perspective of agonistic democratic  theorists  in order to suggest ways  in which the 
idea of a ‘people’ itself can be understood as intrinsically open. As indicated above, the central 
dilemma facing our attempt to overcome the issues posed by statelessness is that the position 






the  agonistic  approach  toward  democratic  theory  that  places  the  issues  of  conflict  and 
contestation  at  the  center  of  the  political.  Using  their  insights  I  will  further  develop  our 
engagement with the issue of statelessness along three dimensions: the unsettled nature of our 
concepts of  citizen and  ‘people,’  the  constitutive  tension between  liberalism and democracy, 
and the potentiality for more inclusive and open notions of community that the agonistic vision 
of politics suggests. These considerations will bring to light how we should understand the basis 
and  bounds  of  community  as  always  inherently  contingent,  and  therefore  help  cultivate  the 
orientation necessary to be attentive to the needs of those excluded. 
Before beginning our engagement with the work of the aforementioned theorists’ it seems best 
to  briefly  address  and  diffuse  the  apparent  opposition  that  such  perspectives  have  been 
claimed  to  have  with  the  approach  of  deliberative  democracy  that  Habermas’  work  is 
associated  with.  Given  the  often  emphasized  challenge  that  the  agonistic  conception  of 
democratic politics claims  to pose  to  the approach  toward radical democracy stemming  from 
the critical theory of Habermas, the attempt to supplement our understanding of the issue of 









Discourse  ethics  does  not  project  the  ideal  of  a  dispute‐free  world,  nor  does  it  devalue 
contestation.  Not  only  is  such  a  world  unattainable,  it  is  also  undesirable.  Diversity  and 
difference lead to criticism, and criticism leads to well founded norms.35 
Positing a  radical opposition between  the  two perspectives and  their  respective emphasis on 
the values of political contestation/conflict and consensus obscures how they can be brought 
together  creatively.  Moreover,  Mouffe’s  tendency  to  criticize  the  consensus‐oriented 
dimension of discourse ethics shows a failure to appreciate the central role of the contestation 
of norms  to Habermas’  approach.  Such an understanding of his project  is  echoed  in Patchen 
Markell’s  reading of Habermas’ project as understanding “democratic politics as an unending 
process  of  contestation”  in  which  there  is  a  clear  recognition  that  “no  actually  existing 



























are  themselves  an  intrinsic  part  of  politics”  and  introduces  the  idea  of  ‘essentially  contested 
concepts’  to  denote  such  terms.39  In  this  way,  he  carefully  frames  his  analysis  of  political 
discourse  in opposition  to what he  calls  ‘empiricist’  or  ‘rationalist’  tendencies within political 
science in order to highlight the deeply political valence of our arguments over the use of such 






Thus,  perhaps  most  importantly  for  our  purposes,  Connolly’s  work  highlights  the  political 
dimension of language itself in ways that enable us to track potential opportunities for political 
innovation  by  allowing  us  to  “expose  conceptual  closure  when  it  has  been  imposed 
artificially.”41 In this way, what Connolly’s analysis forces us to confront is the continually partial 
and  incomplete  nature  of  our  core  political  concepts.  This  suggests  that  the  extension  and 
meaning of such concepts as community and citizenship can never be said to be fully decided, 
while  our  understandings  of  such  central  ideas  as  ‘justice’  at  any  specific moment  are  to  be 
understood  as  always  the  conception  of  a  particular  group  and  therefore  always  open  to 
contestation  and  further  negotiation.  In  this  way,  distancing  ourselves  from  the  approach 
toward our social world that treats such questions as static and ‘operationalizable’ allows us to 



















of  the  category of  citizen as having a  fixed nature, or of  a particular  shibboleth—whether of 
language,  ethnicity,  race,  nationality,  gender  or  class—that  defines  the  bounds  of  political 
membership  once  and  for  all.  The  disputed  and  variable  status  of  the  idea  of  the  citizen  is 
echoed in the work of Judith Shklar, who has pointed out that “there is no notion more central 
in politics than citizenship, and none more variable in history or contested in theory.”42 While 
on  some  banal  level  citizenship  can  be  understood  as  a  particular  relationship  between  the 
individual and the state, the contours of that membership and the status it confers have varied 
widely through the tradition of western thought. Such sentiments regarding the contingent and 













around  the  radical  potentiality  of  a  conception  of  politics  that  emphasizes  the  value  of 
contestation  for  forestalling  the  threat  of  closure  that  seemingly  haunts  our  democratic 
practices. However, Mouffe in particular carries the thematic of contestation to the extreme in 
order  to argue  for  the  irreducibility and  ineliminability of  the potential  for antagonism within 
the domain of the political. Mouffe’s antagonistic conception of politics is in part indebted to a 
tempered  engagement  with  the  work  of  Carl  Schmitt  that  draws  off  his  insistence  on  the 
fundamentally  “conflictual  nature  of  politics”  and  the  importance  of  recognizing  the 
antagonistic and relational basis of identity, while rejecting his insistence on the “existence of a 
homogenous demos.”44 According to Mouffe, this revised vision of politics centered around the 
ever‐present  possibility  of  conflict  is  both more  in  tune with  the  oppositional  foundation  of 
identity  and  more  open  to  the  potentials  for  radical  challenge  and  transformation  that 
democracy allows. 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Within Mouffe’s interpretation of modern democracy, our fundamental framework of political 
activity is structured by the paradoxical tension between democracy as a form of rule and the 
symbolic  framework  of  legalism,  rights,  and  equality,  that  characterizes  liberalism.45  Drawing 
off the  insights of Schmitt’s critique of the  liberal understanding of politics while rejecting his 
dismissal  of  liberalism, Mouffe  emphasizes  how  this  ‘democratic  paradox’  between  the  two 
components of our modern framework of politics leads to a permanent site of tension, for “no 
final  resolution  between  these  two  conflicting  logics  is  possible” with  our  options  limited  to 
only precarious and temporary negotiations of this divide.46 More fundamentally, we can read 
Mouffe’s  identification  of  the  conflicting  logic  of  liberal  democracy  as  part  of  the  deeper 
tension between legality and the sovereign will of the demos. The signature of this conflict runs 
like  a  red  thread  through  the  history  of  political  theory.  Emblematic  of  this  are  Aristotle’s 





By  constantly  challenging  the  relations  of  inclusion‐exclusion  implied  by  the  political 
constitution of  the  ‘people’—required by  the exercise of democracy—the  liberal discourse of 
universal  human  rights  plays  an  important  role  in  maintaining  the  democratic  contestation 
alive. On the other side, it is only thanks to the democratic logics of equivalence that frontiers 
can  be  created  and  a  demos  established  without  which  no  real  exercise  of  rights  would  be 
possible.48 
By dramatizing the site of liberal democracy as contingent and unstable, her analysis brings to 
the  fore  the  radically  precarious  and  problematic  dimension  of  any  attempt  to  permanently 
articulate  more  inclusive  and  open  conceptions  of  community. Moreover, Mouffe’s  warning 
regarding the fragility of any particular political configuration is exceedingly apt in our current 
age of the ‘war on terror’ when the civil rights of citizens, let alone those of resident aliens and 
non‐nationals,  have  been  notably  eroded  under more  or  less  democratic  institutions.  As  she 
notes  of  political  negotiations  in  general,  “every  order  is  the  temporary  and  precarious 
articulation  of  contingent  practices”—a  point  that  emphasizes  the  provisional  and  limited 
character of any political ‘solution.’49 Such observations speak directly to the concerns at hand 
by asking us  to  temper  the cosmopolitan aspirations and pretensions of any project with  the 










recognition  that  the negotiation of  the  terms of political membership  is always  inherently an 
ongoing  political  project  and  can  never  be  considered  a  fait  accompli.  Recognizing  that  the 
universalizing  tendencies  of  liberalism  and  human  rights  discourse  exist  in  tension  with  the 
potentialities of popular  sovereignty brings  to  light  the ever present potential  to  reconstitute 




Our  aforementioned  reading  of  theorists  from  within  the  agonistic  tradition  of  radical 
democracy has attempted to illustrate how an understanding of the political centered around 
conflict  and  contestation  can be put  to  the uses of overcoming  the  conditions  that produces 
statelessness  in  our  contemporary  world.  Such  an  engagement  arguably  provides  a  needed 
supplement to the Habermassian approach toward statelessness by positing new modalities for 
understanding  citizenship  as  intrinsically  open,  and  therefore  provides  a  basis  for  including 
those  presently  excluded  from  our  forms  of  community  in  our  realm  of  moral  concern. 
However, while our discussion of agonism has highlighted the essentially contestable nature of 
claims  to  collective  identity,  it  is  crucial  to  emphasize  that  such  contestability  is  not  equally 




Even  if  all  identities  are  ultimately  unstable  or  contestable,  even  if  they  are  all  produced 
through rather  than  revealing  foundational  truths about  individuals or communities,  they are 
neither produced in the same way or contestable to the same degree. To assume that they are 
is to overlook crucial asymmetries between members of different identity groups.50 
Within  the  context  of  our  current  discussion,  such  considerations  draw  attention  to  the  fact 
that  it  is  just  those who  are most  disadvantaged by  our  current  practices  of  citizenship who 
shall also be least able to challenge the norms that produce contemporary forms of exclusion. 
While the agonistic  lens provides a powerful perspective  for destabilizing and challenging our 
conceptions  of  community,  we  must  also  remain  attentive  to  how  the  potentiality  for 
contestation is often structurally determined. Remaining cognizant of this issue emphasizes the 
importance  of  developing  forms  and  practices  of  solidarity  as  part  of  the  project  of  re‐
conceptualizing our notions of citizenship. Such considerations suggest  that  the  limitations of 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the agonistic perspective point to the need to foster local potentialities of community in ways 
that may  allow  us  to  transcend  the  problematic  bounds  of  the  state  and  build  the  forms  of 
solidarity  necessary  for  more  inclusive  orientations  of  citizenship.  While  such  potentialities 
remain  fragmentary  and  uncertain  at  present,  such  experiments  in  developing  alternative 
practices of citizenship will have to play a central role in any practical attempt to grapple with 
the issues raised by statelessness.  
